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Abstract
The standard treatment of conditional probability leaves conditional probability un-
defined when the conditioning proposition has zero probability. Nonetheless, some find
the option of extending the scope of conditional probability to include zero-probability
conditions attractive or even compelling. This articles reviews some of the pitfalls asso-
ciated with this move, and concludes that, for the most part, probabilities conditional
on zero-probability propositions are more trouble than they are worth.
∗But if you try, sometimes, you might find you get what you need.
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1 Introduction
Let A be a set of propositions, closed under Boolean operations, let P be a probability
function on A, and, for some proposition C, let PC be another probability function on
A, to be thought of as yielding probabilities conditional on C.1 It is uncontroversial
that, if C is in A, these should satisfy
P (AC) = PC(A) P (C). (1)
If P (C) > 0, then the unconditional probability function P , together with the require-
ment that (1) hold, uniquely determines PC(A), for any A ∈ A:
PC(A) =
P (AC)
P (C)
. (2)
If, however, P (C) = 0, then P (AC) is also equal to zero, and (1) is satisfied for any
value whatsoever of PC(A), and so (1) leaves PC(A) completely undetermined.
One reaction, the standard one, is to leave PC(A) undefined except for C ∈ A with
P (C) > 0. But, since (1) places no constraints whatsoever on the function PC when
P (C) = 0, for such propositions we are free, without fear of violating this condition,
to define PC to be any probability function whatsoever on A. Instead of relying on
(2) to define conditional probability functions in terms of the unconditional probability
function P , we can take conditional probability as primitive. This is a route that has
been recommended by a number of authors over the years (see, e.g., Re´nyi 1955, Popper
1938, 1955, 1959, Carnap 1950, Harper 1975, Harper and Ha´jek 1997, Ha´jek 2003, van
Frassen 1976, and Dorr 2010). In support of this, cases are sometimes adduced that
suggest that there are probabilities conditional on zero-probability propositions that
have clearly defined values (see §2, below). Moreover, it might seem that we have to
regard some probabilities conditional on zero-probability propositions as well-defined,
in order to do justice to statistical practice, since statistical practice invokes likelihood
functions, which ascribe probabilities to data as a function of some continuously varying
parameter, and these are well-defined for all parameter values even if every point value
of the parameter is ascribed zero probability. We do not want to eschew the use of
such functions; does this not commit us to probabilities conditional on zero-probability
propositions?
In this essay, I hope to convince the reader that things are not so straightforward.
The examples that purport to show that there are clear-cut answers to requests for
probabilities conditional on propositions of probability zero are misleading. We can
give such questions answers by requiring that the conditional probability functions
possess certain symmetry properties, but this is our choice, not dictated by the nature
of the problem, and we should not let the intuitive appeal of such symmetry properties
blind us to the fact that we must stipulate that the conditional probabilities have
1We will also use the notation P (A|C), when convenient.
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them, in order for the questions to acquire determinate answers. Moreover, there will
be cases in which symmetry conditions that we may wish to impose will clash with each
other, or may clash with the desideratum of countable additivity, illustrating Jagger’s
Theorem: You Can’t Always Get What You Want.2
Furthermore, the consequences of taking the standard route, and leaving undefined
probabilities conditional on null propositions (that is, propositions of unconditional
probability zero), are not as dire as some would make them out to be. Though there
are cases (such as the likelihood functions already mentioned) in which quantities
appear that can unproblematically be taken to be probabilities conditional on null
propositions, they need not be. We can take them to be no more than auxiliary
functions, useful for calculating probabilities. The theory goes along straightforwardly
if we take all conditional probabilities to have conditions with positive probability.
Some will be undaunted, and will insist on introducing a host of null-condition
conditional probabilities. This can be done, but, if it is done, it should be done and
not merely gestured at: those who invoke probabilities conditional on null propositions
should specify which pairs of propositions A, B they take the conditional probability
PB(A) to be defined for, and specify the values of these conditional probabilities.
A comment, before we begin, on the word “probability.” It has become common, in
the philosophical literature on probability, to acknowledge that the word is used in (at
least) two senses. There is an epistemic sense, having to do with degrees of belief, and
a physical sense, having to do with characteristics of chance set-ups. For the most part,
our considerations will bear equally on probability in either sense. When it matters,
we will use the “credence” for the former, epistemic sense, “chance” for the physical
sense, and “probability” when we want to be neutral between the two senses.
2 Examples
Consider the following examples.
2 The fact that, in probability theory, we can’t always get what we want, is a familiar fact. We might want
our probability function to be defined on arbitrary subsets of our probability space, but, as is well-known,
we can’t always do so while satisfying desiderata such as symmetry conditions and countable additivity.
Consider, for example, the task of defining a uniform distribution—that is, a distribution invariant under all
rotations—on the unit circle. There can be no distribution that is invariant under rotations, is countably
additive, and is defined on all subsets of the unit circle. The proof is found in many probability texts, e.g.
Billingsley (2012, p. 47). The standard response is to preserve countable additivity and to restrict the
domain of definition of the probability function to certain subsets of the probability space, the measurable
sets, leaving the probability of other sets undefined. In one and two dimensions, as Banach (1923) showed,
one can extend the probability function to one defined on arbitrary subsets, if one is willing to give up
countable additivity. The well-known Banach-Tarski paradox shows that we can’t do so in three-dimensional
space; there is no finitely additive set function that is defined on all subsets and invariant under translations
and rotations.
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Example 1.3 A number is chosen, with uniform probability, from the interval [0, 1].
Conditional on the supposition that the chosen number is either 1/4 or 3/4, what is
the probability that it is 1/4?
Example 2. (Borel-Kolmogorov).4 A point is chosen, with uniform probability, on
the surface of the earth, which we treat as a perfect sphere.
a). What is the probability that the chosen point is in the Western Hemisphere, given
that that it lies on the equator?
b). Conditional on the chosen point lying on the great circle containing the Greenwich
meridian, what is the probability that it lies closer to the equator than to a pole?
Example 3. A number is chosen, with uniform probability, from the interval [0, 1].
Conditional on the supposition that the chosen number is rational, what is the proba-
bility that it is greater than 1/2?
For many, perhaps most, readers, each of the above questions will have an obvious
answer. This should give us pause.
In each case, the set-up of the problem mentions a uniform probability distribution.
There is a standard way of making this mathematically precise, insofar as unconditional
probabilities are concerned. These unconditional probabilities determine probabilities
conditional on propositions of nonzero probability. They do not determine conditional
probabilities when the conditioning propositions have probability zero. We may extend
our domain of conditioning to include some of these, but there is no canonical way of
doing so. Moreover, when we venture into to the project of extending the domain of
conditioning, if we are not careful, we run the risk of imposing conditions that seem
to be intuitively compelling, but which cannot be jointly satisfied. We must proceed
with caution, if we proceed at all.
3 Symmetry Conditions
3.1 Example 1.
Example 1 seems beguilingly simple. It may seem that the symmetry of the problem
dictates the answer 1/2, on pain of irrationality. Nothing at all in the set-up of the
problem favours either 1/4 or 3/4.
But consider this variant on the question. Suppose that the number is chosen from
the unit interval, not with uniform distribution, but according to a distribution given
by the density function
f(x) = 2x. (3)
3Adapted from Ha´jek (2003).
4Based on Kolmogorov (1950, §V.2), which in turn is based on Borel (1909, §45) (§8.6 of Borel 1965).
See also Jaynes (2003, §15.7), Ha´jek (2003, §4.4).
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Now ask the question: conditional on the number chosen being either 1/4 or 3/4, what
is the probability that it is 1/4?
Here, I suspect, intuitions will vary. To some, the answer might still be, obviously,
1/2. Others, reflecting on the fact that the number chosen is more likely to be greater
than 1/2 than less than 1/2, might regard 3/4 as the more probable value. This
intuition can be given a numerical value by considering, that, for any sufficiently small
positive ,
Pr(X ∈ [34 − , 34 + ])
Pr(X ∈ [14 − , 14 + ])
= 3, (4)
which suggests that the number 3/4 is 3 times as probable as 1/4.
Suppose, now, that we change the question only slightly, and ask: if the number is
chosen from the unit interval according to a distribution with density (3), what is the
probability, conditional on the number chosen being either 1/2 or
√
3/2, that it is 1/2?
Similar considerations suggest that
√
3/2 is more probable than 1/2.
If we give this answer, we have thereby achieved incoherence, because this last
question is just our first question rephrased. X being uniformly distributed on the
unit interval is the same as
√
X being distributed with density (3), and so we have
two ways of asking one and the same question. Taking Y =
√
X, we can ask the same
question via either of:
i). If X is chosen from the unit interval, with uniform distribution, then, conditional
on the chosen number being either 1/2 or 3/4, what is the probability that it is
1/4?
ii). If Y is chosen from the unit interval, with a probability distribution given by
density function (3), then, conditional on the chosen number being either 1/2 or√
3/2, what is the probability that it is 1/2?
We can escape incoherence by requiring that, if a number is chosen according to any
probability distribution on the unit interval that assigns probability zero to all singleton
sets, then, for any finite subset of the unit interval, the probability conditional on the
number being in that subset is the same for every member of the set. And, if we are to
have equiprobability when the distribution is uniform, this is the only way to escape
incoherence, since, for any random variable X, there will always be some function of
X that is uniformly distributed.5 But this convention may seem odd to some: consider
5To see this: let X be any random variable, with distribution µX , and take g(X) to be the function of X
given by
g(X) =
∫ X
−∞
dµX(x). (5)
Then g has range in [0, 1], and, for any a ∈ [0, 1],
P (g(X) ≤ a) = a. (6)
That is, g(X) is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
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a density function that is very sharply peaked around 1/2. On the convention under
consideration, conditional on the supposition that the chosen number is either 1/2 or
9/10 (which could be as many standard deviations away from the peak as we like), 1/2
and 9/10 are equally probable.
These considerations will, I hope, lead some readers who initially regarded question
1 as having an obvious answer to conclude: things aren’t as straightforward as they
seemed.
3.2 The Sphere
Consider, again, Examples 2. A point is chosen, with uniform probability, on the
surface of a sphere, and we are asked to reflect on the questions: a) What is the
probability that the chosen point is in the Western Hemisphere, given that that it lies
on the equator? b) Conditional on the chosen point lying on the great circle containing
the Greenwich meridian, what is the probability that it lies closer to the equator than
to a pole?
For question 2(a), the seemingly obvious answer is 1/2. For 2(b), the obvious answer
might seem to be 1/2, again, as half of the length of any meridian consists of points
that are closer to the equator than to a pole.
But consider this: it is not true that 1/2 of the earth’s surface is closer to the
equator than it is to a pole; more of it is closer to the equator. The probability that
a point chosen with uniform probability is closer to the equator than to a pole is
1/
√
2 ≈ 0.707. Since every point lies on some meridian, we might want to say that the
probability, conditional on our point lying on the Greenwich (or any other) meridian,
of being closer to the equator than to a pole, is 1/
√
2.
Any reader who is wondering whether the correct answer to 2(b) is 1/2 or 1/
√
2
or some other number is reminded: the setup of the problem does not determine
any answer. The answer of 1/2 seems to rely on some intuition that the conditional
probabilities should share relevant symmetries with the unconditional distribution. An
intuition is a dangerous thing; we would do well to replace the intuition with an explicit
requirement regarding symmetries.
In Appendix 1 we define probability spaces and conditional probability spaces.
Given a probability space, we define the associated standard conditional probability
space as the conditional probability space that takes, as its domain of conditioning, all
and only the propositions with nonzero probability. If a probability space is invariant
under a transformation T, then ipso facto so is the standard conditional probability
space. We may want to use symmetry considerations to extend the standard conditional
probability space to one that includes conditionalization on null propositions. As a
first pass, we might be tempted to require that our conditional probability space be
invariant under all transformations—that is, one-one mappings that take measurable
sets to measurable sets—that leave the unconditional probability space that we started
with invariant. This, we might speculate, is the requirement needed to underwrite the
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“obvious” answer to question 2(a). A moment’s reflection, however, reveals that this
is unreasonably strong. Let C be any probability-zero subset of the sphere, and, for
any one-one mapping TC of C onto itself, consider a transformation of the sphere that
consists of performing TC on C and doing nothing elsewhere. Since P (C) = 0, this
transformation does not change the unconditional probability of any set, and so our
unconditional probability space is invariant under this transformation. Thus, to require
invariance under arbitrary transformations that leave the unconditional probability
space invariant entails that probabilities conditional on a null set C be invariant under
arbitrary permutations of C, a requirement that is satisfiable when C is a finite set
but not otherwise.6
The set S of events might have additional structure that we can require our trans-
formations to preserve. In the sphere case, the elementary events are choices of points
on a sphere, and these points have distances between them. We can restrict our atten-
tion to transformations of our probability space that preserve these distances. These
are just the rigid rotations of the sphere. Requiring invariance under all rigid rotations
entails that the conditional probability function, conditional on the chosen point lying
on a circle, be invariant under the subgroup of rotations that leave the circle invariant.
This is is uniquely satisfied by a uniform distribution on the circle.
If the intuition that the obvious answer to the sphere questions 2(a) and 2(b) is 1/2
rests on an implicit assumption that probabilities, conditional on the point lying on a
circle, should be invariant under rotations that leave the circle invariant, then, rather
than leave this implicit, we should place it as an explicit condition on our conditional
probability space. Can we do this? If we’re not too demanding about the extent of
the set B on which we conditionalize, then it is easy to show that we can. This is
done in Appendix 2, where we construct a conditional probability space that includes
conditionalization on all circles and subsets of circles of nonzero length, and is invariant
under rigid rotations of the sphere.
We might want more than this in our domain of conditionalization. Can our condi-
tional probability space be extended in such a way that it includes conditionalization
on all measurable subsets of the sphere, and preserves symmetry under rotations?
If we demand countable additivity, then the answer is easy: no, we can’t. Given
a coordinatization of the sphere by latitude and longitude, consider EQ, the set of
points on the equator whose longitudes are rational numbers. This set is invariant
under rational rotations of the sphere about its axis. Invariance under such rotations
requires that the probability, conditional on EQ, ascribed to any interval of the equator
be proportional to the length of the interval, and this in turn requires the probability
assigned to single points on the equator be zero. But PEQ(EQ) must be equal to one,
and so the conditional probability function PEQ cannot be countably additive.
Similar considerations apply, of course, to Example 3. Our unconditional probabil-
6If C is a finite set, we can have a probability function that always assigns equal probabilities to sets of
equal cardinality. This is not possible if C is infinite. In the infinite case, there must be measurable sets A,
B, of equal cardinality, with P (A) 6= P (B). We can then choose some mapping that takes A to B.
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ity function is invariant under translations of the unit interval (modulo 1). The set of
rationals in the unit interval is invariant under the subgroup consisting of translations
through a rational distance. Imposing translation symmetry on probabilities condi-
tional on the number chosen being rational gives the expected answer: conditional on
the number being rational, the probability that it lies in any interval is equal to the
length of that interval. But this comes at the cost of violating countable additivity.
If we conditionalize on the rationals we are faced with a choice between a symmetry
condition that may be desired, and preserving countable additivity. This is something
that we do not have to face when conditioning on sets of nonzero probability; if P is
countably additive, and P (C) > 0, then PC is also countably additive.
Suppose we’re willing to give up countable additivity. Is there a conditional prob-
ability space that permits conditionalization on arbitrary measurable subsets of the
sphere, and is invariant under rotations? Since this will include conditionalization on
measure-zero subsets of S that are neither invariant under rotations nor contained in
nontrivial subsets that are invariant under rotations, it is likely that, if such conditional
probability spaces do exist, rotational symmetry will not suffice for uniqueness. We
should expect that, if there are any, there are many such spaces, and that it would
not be a trivial task to specify one. It is, as far as I know, an open question whether
such conditional probability spaces exist. Philosophers who write as if one can blithely
assume that such conditional probability spaces exist are kindly requested to show that
they do, and, if there is more than one, to specify which one they have in mind.
3.3 The Eternal Coin
In the case of the sphere, things worked out (reasonably) well. We were able to identify
a natural group of symmetries, and imposition of these symmetries entailed one of the
‘obvious’ answers to our questions. In other cases, we will not be so lucky. Symmetries
that we may wish to impose can come into conflict.
An interesting example of this is provided by Cian Dorr (2010), in the set-up that
he calls “The Eternal Coin.” The Eternal Coin is a fair coin that is flipped every day,
throughout an infinite past, and will continue to be flipped every day into an infinite
future. In the absence of any other information about the coin, we are invited to con-
sider credences in propositions such as
H: The Coin lands Heads today.
P : The Coin landed Heads on every day in the past.
F : The Coin will land Heads on every day in the future.
All credences—including those conditional on propositions with probability zero—will
be taken to be predicated on the setup being as we have described it.7
7This is necessary because, if one has nonzero credence that the coin is not fair, or that the tosses are
not independent, then conditionalization on either F or P will send credence that the setup is as described
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We construct a probability space as follows. Our set Υ of elementary events is the
set of bi-infinite sequences of Heads and Tails. To form a σ-algebra F of measurable
sets, we proceed as follows. For any finite set of integers K, and any u ∈ Υ, we form a
cylinder set CK(u) consisting of all elements of Υ that agree with u on the set K. That
is, a cylinder set is the set of all events that agree on some finite subset of integers. We
take C to be the smallest σ-algebra containing all cylinder sets.8
To define a probability measure Pr on 〈Υ, C〉, it suffices to specify the probabilities
of cylinder sets.9 To do this, we assign, for any k-element set K, the probability 2−k
to each cylinder set CK(u). This function has a unique countably additive extension
to C, which we will take to be our probability measure Pr. This gives us a probability
space 〈Υ, C, P r〉.
This probability measure has, as expected, the following features:
i). Each individual flip has equal probability 1/2 for H and T .
ii). Outcomes of distinct flips are independent: if K, L are disjoint sets, then, for all
u, v ∈ Υ,
Pr(CK(u) ∩ CL(v)) = Pr(CK(u)) · Pr(CL(v)).
For any set of integers L, let FL : Υ→ Υ be the ‘bit flip’ transformation on L, that
is, the transformation that consists of exchanging H and T at each place in L. Our
probability space is invariant under all such transformations.
Our probability space is also invariant under permutations of the integers. For any
bijection pi : Z→ Z, let Tpi : Υ→ Υ be the operation whose action on a bi-sequence u
permutes the values of u,
(Tpiu)k = upi(k). (7)
Permutations that will be of particular interest are the shift operations. For any integer
n, let Sn : Υ→ Υ be the operation of shifting everything n places:
(Snu)k = uk−n. (8)
Invariance under shift operations means that, although our coordinatization has a
distinguished origin (the day 0, which we are calling “today”), our probability space is
invariant under shift of this origin.
If Pn is the proposition that the coin landed Heads on the past n days, then
Pr(Pn) = 2
−n. Since P entails Pn for each n, it follows that Pr(P ) = 0. Similarly,
Pr(F ) = 0.
The function Pr, of course, uniquely determines probabilities conditional on propo-
sitions with non-zero probability. Dorr invites us to consider probabilities conditional
on some zero-probability propositions, such as P , F , and P ∨ F . It is, of course,
to zero.
8See Appendix 1 for definitions of any terms that might be unfamiliar.
9In this section, we use Pr for our probability function to avoid confusion with the proposition P .
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possible to extend our probability assignments to include probabilities conditional on
propositions such as these, and this can be done in a variety of ways.10
Here’s one way to do it. For any n, let Kn = [−n, n], and, for any A ∈ C, let An
be the proposition that commits only to what A says about coin flips in Kn, and says
nothing about what happens outside this interval.11
Our set B of conditions will consist of all nonempty B ∈ C. For B ∈ B, let AB be
the set of A ∈ C such that the sequence P (An|Bn) converges to a limit as n→∞, and,
for A ∈ AB, take
Pr(A|B) = lim
n→∞Pr(An|Bn). (10)
A few of the conditional probabilities that we thereby obtain are,
Pr(H|F ) = Pr(T |F ) = Pr(H|P ) = Pr(T |P ) = 1/2;
Pr(P |P ∨ F ) = Pr(F |P ∨ F ) = 1/2;
Pr(P |P ∨HF ) = Pr(F |HP ∨ F ) = 2/3;
Pr(HF |P ∨HF ) = Pr(HP |HP ∨ F ) = 1/3;
Pr(P ∨HF |P ∨ F ) = Pr(HP ∨ F |P ∨ F ) = 3/4.
(11)
The limiting procedure we have sketched is, of course, only one possible limiting proce-
dure, and no claim is made for priority of this over other procedures. We have made a
frankly arbitrary choice, and have obtained the above conditional probabilities; other
choices will yield other values.
The conditional probabilities we have obtained preserve independence and bit-flip
symmetry. The limiting procedure we have chosen manifestly breaks shift symme-
try. Unsurprisingly, the conditional probabilities we obtain from it also violate shift
symmetry. To see this, consider the one-day shift S1. We have,
S1(P ) = HP S1(HF ) = F (12)
However,
Pr(P |P ∨HF ) 6= Pr(HP |HP ∨ F ). (13)
We therefore have extended our probability function in a way that respects indepen-
dence of distinct flips, and also bit-flip symmetry, but violates shift symmetry. We
10In this section, we will find ourselves conditionalizing on some fairly complex propositions, and so it will
be convenient to switch from the subscript notation for conditional probabilities used in the rest of the paper
to the slash notation.
11That is, take
An =
⋃
u∈A
CKn(u). (9)
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should ask whether we can do better, and extend our probability function in such a
way that all of the above conditional probabilities are defined so as to respect all of
these symmetries.
Dorr shows that, counterintuitively,12 the answer is no. Provided that P (P |P ∨F )
and P (F |P ∨ F ) are defined and are both positive, shift invariance entails that
Pr(H|F ) = Pr(H|P ) = 1. (14)
Proof is given in Appendix 3.
A similar argument yields a violation of countable additivity. Let P+ be the propo-
sition that the coin has landed Heads every day in the past but will land Tails sometime,
either today or in the future, and let F+ be the proposition that the coin will land
Heads every day in the future, but landed Tails today or sometime in the past. Shift
invariance, together with the conditions that Pr(P+|P+ ∨ F+) and Pr(F+|P+ ∨ F+)
are defined and are both nonzero, entails that, for every n, the probability conditional
on P+ that the coin lands Heads today and every day for n days into the future is
one. This in turn entails (letting Hn be the proposition that the coin will land Heads
n days from now and Tn, the proposition that it will land Tails), that, for each n.
Pr(Hn|P+) = 1;
Pr(Tn|P+) = 0; (15)
even though the probability, conditional on P+, that, for some n, Tn is true, is unity.
Including the propositions P , F , and P ∨ F in the set of propositions on which we
can conditionalize, and imposing shift symmetry, is possible, but it comes at a high
cost: we lose independence; it is no longer true that conditionalization on a proposition
that specifies outcomes on a set of days not including today leaves the probability of
the coin landing Heads today unchanged. Symmetry conditions that we would like our
conditional probability space to respect clash; we can’t get all that we want.
Depending on our purpose, we might prefer to preserve one or the other of the
symmetries. If the Eternal Coin is being considered as an idealization of a situation
in which a coin is tossed a large but finite number of times, then shifts will not be
symmetries of the finite system, which is our real object of interest, and so it will not
be important for our purposes to demand shift invariance of the conditional probability
space. There might be other purposes for which shift invariance is of such paramount
importance that it would be worth abandoning independence (though it is hard to see
why it would not be preferable to simply leave those conditional probabilities unde-
fined).
If we think of the setup as involving an actual bi-infinite sequence of coin tosses,
not an idealization of a finite set-up, then, as Dorr convincingly argues, violation of
shift invariance is bizarre. Dorr invites us to imagine ourselves causally isolated from
12Perhaps. The more one thinks about what is required to give values to these conditional probabilities,
the less clear it becomes that we have intuitions about them at all.
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the Eternal Coin. I learn nothing about the outcomes of its flips as the days pass.
Now, consider the following: HP , the proposition that the coin lands Heads today and
landed Heads every day in the past, is the proposition that, tomorrow, I will express
by the words, “The coin landed Heads every day in the past,” the same sentence that
I use today to express the proposition P . Similarly, HP ∨ F is the proposition that I
will express tomorrow using the same words I use today to express P ∨ HF . Today,
when I say “My credence that the coin landed every day in the past, conditional on the
supposition that it either landed Heads every day in the past or will land Heads today
and every day in the future,” I denote Pr(P |P ∨ HF ); tomorrow, the same phrase
denotes Pr(HP |HP ∨ F ). Does it make sense for these to have different values?
To do so involves distinguishing between today and tomorrow in a way that seems
unwarranted by the setup of the problem. Shift invariance, it seems, is a requirement
of rationality.
On the other hand, it is stipulated in the setup that coin tosses on distinct days are
independent of each other. Pr(H|Pn) is equal to 1/2, for every n, no matter how large.
The toss today is independent of every past toss; should it not also be independent of all
the past tosses? Recall that all of these probabilities are meant to be predicated on the
supposition that the setup is as described, which includes stipulation of independent
tosses. For our credences, conditional on this setup, to violate independence, setting
Pr(H|P ) equal to 1, seems no less irrational than violation of shift invariance.
Violation of either symmetry, shift invariance or independence, is a high price to
pay for probabilities conditional on null events. Dorr bites the bullet and preserves shift
invariance at the price of independence, but it is not clear that this is preferred over the
alternative. Better still, it would seem, would to be preserve both symmetries, which
we can do, of course, by restricting the domain of conditionalization to propositions
with positive probability.
4 Probabilities conditional on a σ-algebra
Consider, once again, Example 2. As noted, an “obvious” answer to the question 2(a)
of the probability that a point chosen with uniform probability on the sphere lies in the
Western hemisphere, conditional on the supposition that it lies on the equator, is 1/2.
For the question 2(b) of the probability that the point lies closer to an equator than a
pole, conditional on the supposition that it lies on the Greenwich meridian, both 1/2
and 1/
√
2 seem to have merit.
One way to think about question 2(a) is to imagine that, first, a circle of latitude
is chosen, and then a point is chosen on that circle according a probability distribution
conditional on the point lying on the circle. Taking the total area of the surface of the
sphere to be 1, the area between two circles of latitude, at angles a, b, measured from
the equator, is equal to
1
2
∫ b
a
cosφ dφ.
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This means that the latitude Φ must be distributed according to
P (Φ ∈ A) = 1
2
∫
A
cosφ dφ. (16)
That is, Φ has density function
fΦ(φ) =
1
2
cosφ. (17)
The longitude Θ is distributed with uniform probability on [−pi, pi], and so has density
function
fΘ(θ) =
1
2pi
. (18)
Latitude and longitude are independent random variables. That is,
P (Φ ∈ A& Θ ∈ B)) = P (Φ ∈ A) P (Θ ∈ B) =
∫
A
fΦ(φ) dφ
∫
B
fΘ(θ) dθ. (19)
for all measurable A ⊆ [−pi/2, pi/2] and B ⊆ [−pi, pi].
What should the conditional distribution of the longitude Θ be taken to be, condi-
tional on a given circle of latitude? We may want the conditional probabilities to mesh
with the unconditional probabilities in a nice way, and demand
P (Φ ∈ A& Θ ∈ B) =
∫
A
P (Θ ∈ B|Φ = φ) fΦ(φ) dφ (20)
for all measurable A,B. The simplest way to do this, which is also the way that is
naturally suggested by the independence of Θ and Φ, is to take P (Θ ∈ B|Φ = φ), for
each B, to have the constant value P (Θ ∈ B), independent of φ. But it’s not the only
way. We can take any set of latitudes of measure zero, and choose distributions for
Θ, conditional on Φ = φ in that set, any way we want, and still satisfy the meshing
condition (20). That means that (20) is compatible with any answer to question 2(a).
It is natural, however, to take P (Θ ∈ B|Φ = φ) to be, for each B, a continuous
function of φ. This condition, together with the meshing condition (20), uniquely fixes
P (Θ ∈ B |Φ = φ) = P (Θ ∈ B). (21)
Similarly, we can define conditional distributions of latitude, conditional on meridian
lines (lines of constant longitude), and demand that these also mesh with the uncon-
ditional probabilities:
P (Φ ∈ A& Θ ∈ B) =
∫
B
P (Φ ∈ A|Θ = θ) fΘ(θ) dθ (22)
This, together with the requirement that for each A, P (Φ ∈ A|Θ = θ) be a continuous
function of θ, uniquely fixes
P (Φ ∈ A|Θ = θ) = P (Φ ∈ A), (23)
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corresponding to conditional density functions
fΦ(φ |Θ = θ) = 1
2
cosφ. (24)
Consider, now, question 2(b). What is the probability that the point lies closer to
an equator than a pole, conditional on the supposition that it lies on the Greenwich
meridian? We can imagine that a meridian is first chosen, and then a point chosen
on that meridian. Using (23) yields the result that, conditional on any meridian, the
probability is 1/
√
2 that the chosen point is closer to the equator than to a pole.
On the other hand, since we are only imagining these things, we can also imagine the
sphere partitioned by circles parallel to the circle containing the Greenwich meridian
(see Figure 1) and imagine that first one of these circles is chosen, and then a point
chosen on that circle according to a probability distribution conditional on the circle.
If this procedure is to yield uniform probabilities on the sphere, we must have the
distributions on almost all of these circles be uniform, and this plus continuity militates
a uniform distribution on all of them. This yields the answer 1/2 to question 2(b).
Figure 1: Two coordinatizations of the sphere.
Which answer is correct? If the point on the sphere is, in fact, chosen according to
one of the two-step procedures we have imagined, then such a set-up privileges one of
the answers. But if the point is simply chosen, with uniform probability, on the sphere,
then the set-up privileges neither answer, and, if one or the other has greater intuitive
appeal, this may be because one is implicitly assuming one or the other scenario.
14
A circle is just a circle,13 and the great circle containing the Greenwich meridian,
qua circle on the sphere, is an element of many different partitions of the sphere. If
we really think that fΦ(φ |Θ = 0), as given by (24), is a conditional density function
yielding the distribution of the random variable Φ conditional on the supposition that
Θ = 0, then it shouldn’t matter how this supposition is described. The supposition
can equally well be described using coordinates that take circles parallel to the great
circle containing the Greenwich meridian as lines of latitude φ′. Then the great circle
containing our original Greenwich meridian is the set of points for which φ′ = 0. On
this circle the new longitude θ′ differs from the old latitude φ by a constant, and, if we
choose the zero-point of our new longitude as our old equator, we will have θ′ equal to
φ on the circle. But a uniform distribution of the new longitude on circles of constant
φ′ requires a conditional density function
fΘ′(θ
′ |Φ′ = φ′) = 1
2pi
(25)
It can’t be the case that, conditional on the chosen point lying on the circle that is the
great circle containing the Greenwich meridian of our first coordinatization and is the
equator of our second, we have different conditional distributions depending on how
we describe the circle. Taking (24) to yield the conditional distribution of Φ on this
circle is incompatible with a uniform distribution of Θ′, as given by (25).
All of this suggests that perhaps we are better off leaving probabilities conditional
on null propositions undefined. Nonetheless, we can still write the probability function
on the sphere in the form (20) or (22), and this can be a useful thing to do, whether or
not we regard the quantities P (Φ ∈ A |Θ = θ) and P (Θ′ ∈ B |Φ′ = φ′) as conditional
probabilities.
Whether or not we think of them as genuine conditional probabilities, quantities
such as P (Φ ∈ A |Θ = θ) are always there if we want them—that is, they can be shown
to always exist. Given a probability space 〈Ω,A, P 〉, and a random variable X, with
distribution µ, we can always find a function fA : R → R such that, for all Borel sets
∆,
P (A&X ∈ ∆) =
∫
∆
fA(x) dµ(x). (26)
The existence of such functions is guaranteed by the Radon-Nikodym theorem (see,
e.g., Billingsley (2012, §32–33).) The condition (26) defines the function fA only up to
13Oddly enough, this has been disputed. In connection with this example, E.T. Jaynes (2003, p. 470)
writes,
Nearly everybody feels that he knows perfectly well what a great circle is; so it is difficult to get
people to see that the term ‘great circle’ is ambiguous until we specify what limiting operation
is to produce it.
This strikes me as confused. One and the same great circle can be the limit of many different decreasing
sequences of subsets of the sphere, but the circle is not itself produced by the limiting operation. Not so
with probabilities conditional on a great circle, which, unless stipulated as primitive, are obtained via some
limiting operation.
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sets of probability zero. If fA is any function satisfying (26), then any function that
differs from fA only on a set of probability zero will also satisfy it, and any functions
that satisfy the condition will differ at most on a set of probability zero.
Such functions always exist, and can be useful calculational tools. But, as we
have seen, it may be problematic to regard fA(x) as yielding a conditional probability,
namely, the probability of A, conditional on the supposition that X = x. The problem,
illustrated by the example of the sphere, is the existence of some other random variable,
X ′, such that one and the same set of events can be equivalently picked out by two
conditions X = x and X ′ = x′. Continuity or other considerations might lead to
functions fA and f
′
A that differ on the set C picked out by either the condition X = x
or X ′ = x′. Yet the probability of A, conditional on an event C, should depend only
on A and C, and not how we happen to describe the event C. The standard view,
which goes back to Kolmogorov (1950, p. 51), is that, useful as such functions are, we
ought not to regard them as yielding probabilities conditional on an event of probability
zero.14
Generalizing: for any probability space 〈Ω,A, P 〉, and any σ-algebra G ⊆ A, and
any A ∈ A, a function gA : Ω → R is said to be a conditional probability of A with
respect to G iff it is a G-measurable function such that
P (AG) =
∫
G
gA dP (27)
for all G ∈ G. We will write gA = P (A||G).15 Condition (27) then becomes
P (AG) =
∫
G
P (A||G) dP. (28)
Ha´jek (2003, 291) calls this “Kolmogorov’s elaboration of the ratio formula.”
Functions of the sort appearing in (26) are yielded as special cases. For any random
variable X, let σ(X) be the σ-algebra consisting of the sets X−1(B), where B ranges
over Borel subsets of the real line. Let P (A||σ(X)) be a conditional probability of A
with respect to σ(X). Recall, this is a function from our sample space Ω to the reals.
The condition that it be a σ(X)-measurable function entails that it is constant on sets
of constant X. That is, if, for two points ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, we have X(ω) = X(ω′), then the
function P (A||σ(X)) must take on the same value at these points: P (A||σ(X))(ω) =
P (A||σ(X))(ω′). We can define a function fA : R→ R via
fA(X(ω)) = P (A||σ(X))(ω). (29)
If P (A||σ(X)) satisfies (28), then fA will satisfy (26).
14In his discussion of the Borel paradox, Kolmogorov writes, “This shows that the concept of a probability
conditional on an isolated given hypothesis whose probability equals 0 is inadmissible” (Kolmogorov, 1950,
p. 51).
15The notation is intended to be both reminiscent of, and distinct from, the notation used for conditional
probabilities.
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Conditional probabilities, as usually conceived, that is, as defined by ratios of uncon-
ditional probabilities, are a special case of these conditional probabilities with respect
to a σ-algebra. Let {Gi} be a countable partition, and let G be the σ-algebra generated
by this partition. Since the elements of the partition {Gi} are atoms of this σ-algebra,
and P (A||G) is required to be a G-measurable function, it must be a constant function
on each Gi. Let P (A|Gi) be the value that P (A||G)(ω) takes on for ω ∈ Gi. Then the
condition that (28) hold for all G ∈ G is equivalent to the condition that
P (AGi) = P (A|Gi)P (Gi), (30)
which, of course, yields the familiar ratio formula for P (A|Gi) whenever P (Gi) > 0. In
this sense, we have a generalization of conditional probabilities.
When an agent learns which element of {Gi} is true, she at the same time learns
the truth value of each proposition in the σ-algebra G. The heuristic idea behind the
introduction of probabilities conditional on more general σ-algebras is to mimic this.
A random variable X partitions the space Ω of events into sets of constant X. If a
point ω is chosen from Ω, learning the valuing of X(ω) provides partial information
about ω; it tells us for every set ∆ ∈ σ(X), whether or not ω ∈ ∆. Similarly for other
σ-algebras, whether or not generated by a random variable; a specification, for each
set in a σ-algebra G, whether or not ω is in that set, provides some information about
ω, information that is partial unless singleton sets are among the members of G.
Let G ⊆ A be a σ-algebra that contains atoms—that is, elements of G with no
non-empty proper subsets in G—that cover Ω. For A ∈ A, let P (A||G) be a conditional
probability of A with respect to G. If G is an atom of G, then P (A||G) must take on a
constant value on G. Should we regard this value, the value of P (A||G) for ω ∈ G, as
the probability of A conditional on the proposition G?
There are two sorts of problems with this. The first is technical and local, in that it
applies only to certain σ-algebras that we might dismiss as pathological. Nonetheless,
it should give us pause, as it shows that the heuristic motivation of the characterization
of P (A||G), namely, as conditional probabilities resulting from information specifying,
for each element G of a σ-algebra G, whether or not ω ∈ G, can break down. The second
sort of problem is conceptual and global, and poses a serious objection to taking the
value of P (A||G) for ω ∈ G, as the probability of A conditional on the proposition G
(except in special circumstances, to be discussed in the next section).
The first problem is this. On the heuristic view that P (A||G), evaluated on some
atom G of G, yields the probability of A appropriate to learning that ω ∈ G, we
would expect that, if G is a σ-algebra whose atoms are all the singleton sets, then
P (A||G) would be equal to 1 if ω is in A and 0 if not, since learning which atom of
G obtains is complete information about ω. But this won’t always be the case. Let
our probability space be the unit interval with Lebesgue measure. Let G consist of the
smallest σ-algebra containing all of the singleton sets; this consists of the countable
sets and their complements. Now let A be any set with P (A) ∈ (0, 1). It is easy to
see that P (A||G)(ω) must be equal to P (A) for almost all ω, violating our expectation
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that it will everywhere be equal to 0 or 1.16
This problem can be thought of one of being excessively permissive about the
sub-σ-algebras on which we may conditionalize. Easwaran (2008, §8.1) makes a well-
motivated proposal on which this problem does not arise. Instead of conditionalizing
on arbitrary sub-σ-algebras, we consider only those that consist of all the measurable
sets that are unions of elements of some partition E . Call the σ-algebra consisting of
the elements of A that are unions of elements of a partition E , AE . If the information
on which we are to update consists of a specification of which element of E obtains,
then AE is the relevant sub-σ-algebra, since specifying which element of the partition E
contains ω is equivalent to specifying, for every F ∈ AE , whether or not ω ∈ A. If the
partition E contains all singleton sets, then AE is just A, and, for any A ∈ A, P (A||AE)
must be equal, on all but a set of measure zero, to the characteristic function of A.
The second problem is the one we have already been discussing, and it is more
serious. Let G be an atom of a σ-algebra G. Though, for any G with P (G) = 0, the
condition (28) leaves the value of P (A||G) on G undetermined, the condition together
with other natural constraints, such as requiring P (A||G) to be a continuous function,
can, as we have seen, determine the value of P (A||G) on G. But this is not enough
to warrant taking this value as the probability of A, conditional on G, since the same
set G will be an atom of other σ-algebras, and the same considerations might dictate
that, for some other σ-algebra G′ containing G, the value that P (A||G′) has on G be
different from the value that P (A||G) on G. In cases, such as the sphere example, in
which the set-up privileges neither σ-algebra, it would be a mistake to take either of
these values (or any other) as the probability of A conditional on G.
This is, as mentioned, the standard view. Taking up this suggestion, Easwaran
concludes,
this means we must view conditional probability as (in general) a three-place
function, depending not only on A and G, but also the partition G defining
the set of “relevant alternatives” to G. In particular cases, this partition
will be specified by the experiment an agent is considering G as an outcome
to, or the set of alternative hypotheses under consideration, or some other
contextual factor. Thus, we must think of conditional degree of belief as a
function P (A|G,G) rather than just P (A|G) (Easwaran, 2011, pp. 143–44).
We should ask: under what conditions will there be a set of relevant alternatives that
is uniquely picked out by the set-up?
It is frequently suggested, as in the quotation from Easwaran, that it is the experi-
ment that yields the data that determines a relevant partition (see also the discussion
in Re´nyi 2007a, §2.1). On this rationale, though, it is hard to see that we would ever
need to go beyond a finite partition. Unless we are entertaining the fiction of agents
with infinite powers of discrimination, there are only finitely many distinguishable al-
16This is example 33.11 of Billingsley (2012).
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ternatives as to the outcome of any experiment.17 Even if we do imagine agents with
infinite powers of discrimination, the set of alternatives they could record, using a finite
alphabet, in a lab notebook of finite capacity, is a finite set.
Unproblematic null-condition conditional probabilities are not as commonplace as
some of the literature might suggest. However, there are cases in which the set-up of
a problem does permit one to speak unambiguously of the the probability of an event
conditional on a null proposition. In those cases, null-condition conditional probabil-
ities are unobjectionable, and they can be useful, though they are not indispensable.
These are the subject of the next section.
5 Unproblematic Null-Condition Probabilities
5.1 Likelihood functions
It is common, in statistical practice, to regard outcomes of some experiment as be-
ing generated by an incompletely known probability distribution characteristic of the
experimental set-up. Data gathered is used to gain information about that distribu-
tion. We commonly consider a family of candidate distributions; typically this family
is indexed by some set of parameters. For instance, we might regard an experimentally
measurable variable as being normally distributed with unknown mean µ and unknown
variance σ2. A data-set is generated, and is used to gain information about the values
of the parameters.
Let Ω be the set of possible outcomes of an experiment, and let F be the set of
measurable subsets of Ω. Suppose that the candidate probability distributions are
characterized by specifying the values of n parameters (θ1, θ2, ..., θn). We take our
parameter space Γ to be the set of all such ordered n-tuples of parameters. For every
n-tuple θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θn), let Pθ be the corresponding probability distribution on
〈Ω,F〉. For each E ∈ F , let LE be the function from Γ to the real numbers defined by
LE(θ) = Pθ(E). (31)
These functions are called likelihood functions. Given a proposition E about the exper-
imental outcome (which might, for example, be a specification of the data gathered),
we can, for example, ask which n-tuple θ of parameters yields the highest value of
LE(θ); this will be the maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters.
In standard, frequentist statistics, the parameter space is not itself subject to prob-
abilistic considerations; it is regarded as nonsensical to ascribe probabilities, prior or
posterior, to propositions regarding values of the parameters. Hence, Pθ is not regarded
as a conditional probability distribution, conditional on a proposition of probability 0.
17This is even easier to see in these days in which laboratory equipment has digital readout than it was in
the old days of pointers and dials!
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On a Bayesian approach, on the other hand, one also ascribes probabilities to propo-
sitions regarding the values of the parameters, and the process of gaining information
about the parameter values is modelled by conditionalization on the experimental re-
sult. Let G be a σ-algebra of subsets of the parameter space Γ. Let H be the smallest
σ-algebra containing all sets of the form F × G, with F ∈ F and G ∈ G. Suppose
that, for each E ∈ F , the likelihood function LE(θ) is a G-measurable function. Then,
given a probability measure Q on 〈Γ,G〉, we can form a new probability space whose
event space is the Cartesian product Ω×Γ of the experimental outcome space and the
parameter space, and whose measurable sets are the sets in H: we define a probability
measure P as the unique countably additive extension to H of the function that, for
F ∈ F and G ∈ G, is given by
P (F ×G) =
∫
G
LF (θ) dQ. (32)
We now have a probability space 〈Ω × Γ,H, P 〉. The experimental outcome X,
and parameter value Θ, are random variables on this probability space. The σ-algebra
σ(X) that consists of propositions about the experimental outcome is F × Γ—that is,
the set whose elements are sets of the form F , for all F ∈ F—, and σ(Θ), the σ-algebra
that consists of propositions about parameter values, is Ω× G. One can readily verify
that a version of conditional probability with respect to σ(Θ) is obtained by setting
P (E||Θ)(ω) = LE(Θ(ω)). (33)
Any version of conditional probability with respect to σ(Θ) will have to agree with
(33) with probability 1.
Is it permissible to regard the values of P (E||Θ) on the atoms of σ(Θ) as prob-
abilities conditional on null propositions? There is a natural one-one correspondence
between the atoms of σ(Θ) and the points in the parameter space Γ. In this case, we
have a σ-algebra that is picked out as special by the set-up of the problem; the random
variable Θ represents the parameters of the system about which we are trying to gain
information, and the atoms of the σ-algebra σ(Θ) correspond to maximal specification
of these parameters. In this case, there seems no threat of ambiguity due to variant
choices of σ-algebra to conditionalize on, and we can, relatively unproblematically,
regard these values as null-condition probabilities.
We can form a conditional probability space by taking the set B of permissible
conditions to include, in addition to all propositions with positive probability, also the
atoms of σ(Θ), corresponding to point values of our parameters. This still leaves us
with a set of conditions that, though it goes beyond the standard set, is still fairly
sparse compared to the full set H of measurable sets.
It is not uncommon to deal with nested families of models, in which the parameter
space of one model is a lower-dimensional subspace of the parameter space of another.
This might come about, for example, by considering a model in which the value of some
parameter is fixed, or two parameters are constrained to be equal. We will want to
20
retain the same likelihoods in the reduced model. We will also want a probability distri-
bution over the the reduced space. Here the issue illustrated by the Borel-Kolmogorov
paradox resurfaces; the probability distribution on the higher-dimensional space does
not determine a distribution on the lower-dimensional space, and defining one via a lim-
iting procedure will lead to differing results, depending on the procedure chosen. It is a
mistake to regard the lower-dimensional model as being obtained, in a straightforward
way, from the higher-dimensional model via conditionalization.
Though, in this case, it is permissible to treat the likelihoods as probabilities con-
ditional on point-values of the parameters, it is by no means necessary to do so. All of
our standard statistical reasoning goes through if we restrict our domain of condition-
alization to the traditional choice of sets with positive probability.
If we obtain evidence E about the experimental outcome, then we can update our
credences about parameter values via conditionalization. For any measurable subset
∆ of parameter-space,
P (Θ ∈ ∆)→ PE(Θ ∈ ∆) = P (E & Θ ∈ ∆)
P (E)
. (34)
If the prior distribution of Θ is given by a density function µ, then the process of
conditionalization yields a new density function µE . In order for (34) to be satisfied,
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we must have, for almost all θ,18
µE(θ) =
LE(θ)µ(θ)
P (E)
. (40)
This is often called the continuous form of Bayes’ theorem. Thinking of (40) as a form
of Bayes’ theorem invites to think of LE(θ) as the probability of E conditional on a
point value of the parameter θ. But the use of the new density µE is to generate the
new probability distribution PE , and this can be done directly via (34), and there is
no need to invoke probabilities conditional on null subsets of the parameter space.
All that we need for Bayesian statistical inference is the probability space 〈Ω ×
Γ,H, P 〉, and operations on this, including conditionalization on new evidence, can go
through in the standard way, without invoking any conditional probabilities conditional
on null subsets of the parameter space. We can, if convenient, work with the likeli-
hood functions LE(θ), whose existence is guaranteed by the Radon-Nikodym theorem.
But there is no need to regard these as bona fide conditional probabilities, and their
usefulness as calculational tools does not depend on any such interpretation.
5.2 Stochastic processes
In the theory of stochastic processes, we deal with a set {Xt | t ∈ T} of random variables,
where the index t is to be thought of as a time index (which may be continuous or
18To see this: suppose that the probability distribution Q over the parameters is given by a density function
µ. That is, for all Borel subsets ∆ of the parameter space,
Q(Θ ∈ ∆) =
∫
∆
µ(θ) dθ. (35)
Then, by (32),
P (E & Θ ∈ ∆) =
∫
∆
LE(θ)µ(θ) dθ. (36)
Combing this with (34), we get
PE(Θ ∈ ∆) = P (E & Θ ∈ ∆)
P (E)
=
∫
∆
LE(θ)µ(θ)
P (E)
dθ. (37)
Suppose, now, that PE is given by a density function µE .
PE(Θ ∈ ∆) =
∫
∆
µE(θ) dθ. (38)
Then, setting (74) and (75) equal to each other, we get∫
∆
µE(θ) dθ =
∫
∆
LE(θ)µ(θ)
P (E)
dθ. (39)
Since this must be true for every Borel set ∆, the integrands must be equal almost everywhere.
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discrete). As an example, consider the following simple two-step process, adapted
from Bayes (1763). A ball is thrown onto a square table ABCD, with unit sides,
with uniform probability on the square for its landing place. A line is drawn through
its landing point, parallel to AD. We then throw a second ball, again with uniform
probability, and are provided with a report of whether the second ball landed to the
left or the right of the line we drew. In this case, it is unproblematic to say that,
conditional on the first ball’s landing at a distance x from the left side of the table, the
chance of the second ball landing to the left of the line is x.
But we don’t have to; everything we need to say about the process can be said
without invocation of null-condition conditional probabilities. Let X1 be the random
variable that represents the distance of the landing place of the first ball from the left
side of the table, and let X2 be the random variable that takes on the value L or R
depending on whether the second ball lands to the left or right of the line through the
landing-place of the first ball. We can specify the two-step process by saying that X1
is uniformly distributed on (0, 1), and that conditional probabilities for X2 are given
by
P (X2 = L |X1 = x) = x
P (X2 = R |X1 = x) = 1− x. (41)
But we can also specify the same probability distribution over possible outcomes of the
two-step process by saying that joint probabilities regarding X1 and X2 satisfy
P (X2 = L&X1 ∈ ∆) =
∫
∆
x dx
P (X2 = R&X1 ∈ ∆) =
∫
∆
(1− x) dx (42)
for every Borel set ∆ ⊆ (0, 1). Null-condition conditional probabilities, though they
may provide a useful way of talking, are not needed to specify the stochastic process.
More generally, given a stochastic process involving random variables {Xt | t ∈ T},
for any time t0 we can consider the set of random variables with t ≤ t0, and form a
σ-algebra T0 generated by this set of random variables. For any proposition of the form
Xr ∈ ∆, we will have conditional probabilities with respect to T0, P (Xr ∈ ∆||T0). The
values these take on the atoms of T0 may be regarded as probabilities conditional on a
full specification of events up to t0, even if these atoms have zero probability.
Cautions that by now are familiar are in place: though the set-up gives us a priv-
ileged σ-algebra, namely, the σ-algebra corresponding to a full specification of events
up to t0, including these events in our set of admissible conditions for conditional
probability still leaves us with a rather sparse set of conditions, and problems and
ambiguities may arise if we seek to include in our set of conditions null propositions
with less than complete information about the past. Secondly, the stochastic process
only specifies these conditional probabilities for almost all histories; different versions
of the conditional probabilities may differ on probabilities conditional on past histories
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in some set of measure zero. These are not taken as corresponding distinct stochastic
processes, as they yield the same probability for any set of events.
The Eternal Coin example of §3.3 illustrates this latter point. Let P be the σ-
algebra consisting of propositions about results of coin tosses to the past of today. The
atoms of this σ-algebra comprise all possible complete specifications of the past; the
proposition P , that the coin landed heads every day in the past, is one such. The
proposition H, that the coin lands heads today, is independent of the σ-algebra P.
That is,
P (AH) = P (A) P (H) (43)
for all A ∈ P. This entails that we must have
P (H||P)(u) = P (H) = 1/2 (44)
for almost all u in our event space. But this doesn’t preclude Dorr, or anyone else so
inclined, from assigning the value 1, or any other value, to the probability of H condi-
tional on the proposition P , or on any set of propositions comprising a set of measure
zero. Distinct choices of this sort yield the same probabilities for all propositions about
histories.
This agreement of conditional probabilities up to a set of conditions of total prob-
ability zero is, arguably, all that matters when it comes to formulation of a stochastic
process. Suppose that we are formulating a physical theory with stochastic dynam-
ics, and formulate the theory in terms of transition probabilities, that is, probabilities
about future events conditional on past events. Suppose that we have two specifications
of such transition probabilities, that agree for almost all conditions, but assign differ-
ent conditional probabilities to some events, on a set of conditions of total probability
zero. Do we have here two distinct physical theories, or two different formulations of
the same theory?
Both specifications share the same possibility space, that is, the same set of pos-
sible histories. They agree on which propositions about histories are to be assigned
probabilities, and they agree on what those probabilities are. These things are all
that matters, in formulating a stochastic theory; the means we use to specify them is
inessential. They should be counted as alternate formulations of essentially the same
theory.
5.3 The Principal Principle
The Principal Principle, so named by Lewis (1980), is the prescription that your cre-
dence at time t in a proposition A, conditional on the supposition that the chance at
t of A is x and any admissible proposition, be x. That is,
Crt(A | cht(A) = x& E) = x. (45)
for any admissible E, where “[a]dmissible propositions are the sort of information
whose impact on credence about outcomes comes entirely by way of credence about
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the chances of those outcomes” (Lewis, 1980, p. 272). This is to be true for every
value of x in [0, 1]. Any credences about the chance of A will assign zero credence to
uncountably many singleton sets. Thus, it looks as if the Principal Principle commits
us to conditionalizing on null propositions.
This, again, is unobjectionable, as we have a distinguished σ-algebra, consisting
of propositions of the form cht(A) ∈ ∆, where ∆ ranges over Borel subsets of [0, 1].
But use of the Principal Principle itself does not by itself commit us to null-condition
probabilities.
The work that the Principal Principle does is to ensure that our credences about
A mesh with our credences about the chance of A. Suppose that µE is the probability
function that represents an agent’s credences about the chance of A, conditional on
some admissible evidence E. That is,
Crt(cht(A) ∈ ∆|E) =
∫
∆
dµE(x). (46)
Then we will have (assuming that the conditional probabilities are defined),
Crt(A | E) =
∫
Crt(A | cht(A) = x & E) dµE(x). (47)
Imposing the Principal Principle entails that
Crt(A | E) =
∫
x dµE(x). (48)
This condition encapsulates the effect of Principal Principle on the agent’s credence:
it ensures that the agent’s credences about A mesh properly with credence about the
chance of A.
We can achieve the same effect—that is, ensure satisfaction of (48)— without ref-
erence to probabilities conditional on null propositions. All need do is prescribe that,
for every interval ∆ ⊆ [0, 1] with Crt(cht(A) ∈ ∆) > 0, and any admissible E,
Crt(A | E & cht(A) ∈ ∆) ∈ ∆. (49)
Satisfaction of this condition entails that joint credences about a proposition and the
chance of that proposition satisfy (48). Thus, even without primitive probabilities
conditional on null propositions, we get what we need.
We can readily extend (49) to credences about multiple propositions and their
chances. For any finite set A = {A1, ..., An} of propositions, we require that, for all
measurable ∆ ⊆ [0, 1]n, with Crt(cht(A ∈ ∆)) > 0,
Crt(A1 & A2 &...& An| E & cht(A) ∈ ∆) ∈ Conv(∆), (50)
where Conv(∆) is the convex hull of ∆.
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6 Conclusion
Talk of probabilities conditional on zero-probability propositions is common in the
philosophical literature. There is nothing necessarily incoherent in such talk, and we
may, for certain purposes, find it convenient to include such propositions in the stock
of proposition on which we conditionalize. But the motivations for doing so have been
exaggerated.
Moreover, though symmetry considerations may guide us in choice of probabil-
ity distribution conditional on null propositions, such considerations can be less than
reliable guides. Imposing the requirement that the conditional probability space be
invariant under all symmetries of the unconditional probability space is excessively
restrictive. If we want to extend our conditional probability space to include condi-
tionalization on null propositions, we will have to be selective about which symmetries
of the unconditional probability space we impose on the conditional probability space.
In some cases—such as the sphere—there may be a natural choice of which symme-
tries to impose. In other cases, of which Dorr’s Eternal Coin is a striking example,
symmetry considerations will lead us in opposing directions, without a clear choice to
be made.
If, nonetheless, you want to include null propositions in your set of conditions:
proceed with caution, and with care to state explicitly how your conditional probability
space is to be constructed.
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Appendix 1 Terminology
1.1 Probability Spaces
For any set S, an algebra of subsets of S is a set of subsets of S that contains S and
is closed under complementation and unions. A σ-algebra of subsets of S is an algebra
that is closed under countable unions. For the real line R, we define the Borel sets as
the smallest σ-algebra containing all open intervals.
If A is an algebra of subsets of S, a function P : A → R is additive iff, for any
disjoint A,B ∈ A,
P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B).
If A is a σ-algebra of subsets of S, a function P : A → R is countably additive iff,
for any sequence {Ai} of disjoint sets in A,
P (
∞⋃
i=1
Ai) =
∞∑
i=1
P (Ai).
A probability space is a triple 〈S,A, P 〉, where S is a set, to be thought of as the
set of elementary events, A is an algebra of subsets of S, which are the sets of events
(propositions) to which probabilities will be ascribed, and P : A → R is a probability
function, that is, a positive, additive set function with P (S) = 1. Since we will have
reasons to consider probability functions that are not countably additive, we depart
from tradition in not assuming countable additivity unless explicitly stated. If we
require countable additivity, then A is required to be a σ-algebra, and we will refer to
P as a probability measure.
If 〈S,A, P 〉 is a probability space, a random variable is a measurable function
X : S → R, that is, a function such that, for any Borel set B, the set
X−1(B) = {ω ∈ S |X(ω) ∈ B}
is in A. A random variable X generates a subalgebra of A, called σ(X), which is the
set of all X−1(B), as B ranges over Borel subsets of the real line.
1.2 Conditional Probability Spaces
Following Re´nyi (1955, 2007b),19 we define a conditional probability space as a quadru-
plet 〈S,A,B, P 〉, where S is a set of events, A an algebra of subsets of S, B a subset
19Though inspired and instructed by Re´nyi’s treatment, this definition departs from Re´nyi in two ways.
First, Re´nyi requires PB(A) to be defined for every A ∈ A. This may be undesirable; see Appendix 2.
Second, Re´nyi requires countable additivity, and we leave open the possibility of conditional probability
functions that are merely finitely additive.
In his later book, (2007a), Re´nyi revises the definition of a conditional probability space to exclude zero-
probability conditions, and further requires that the set B of conditions be closed under finite disjunctions,
and that it contain a sequence {Bn} that covers Ω (see §2.2). A subset of a σ-algebra A satisfying these two
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of A, to be thought of as the set of events on which we may conditionalize, and P is
a function that takes B ∈ B to a function PB : AB → R, where, for each B, AB is a
subalgebra of A, and
i). For each B ∈ B
(a) PB(A) ≥ 0 for all A ∈ AB.
(b) For all A ∈ A, if B ⊆ A, then A ∈ AB and PB(A) = 1.
(c) For disjoint A,A′ ∈ AB, PB(A ∪A′) = PB(A) + PB(A′).
ii). For all B,C ∈ B and A,B ∈ AC , if BC ∈ B then
PC(AB) = PBC(A) PC(B),
provided that B ∈ AC and A ∈ ABC .
A conditional probability space can be thought of as a family of probability spaces
{〈S,AB, PB〉 | B ∈ B}, required to mesh with each other via (ii).
It is an immediate consequence of (ii) that, for any C ∈ B and B ⊆ C, if B ∈ AC
and PC(B) > 0, then, for all A ∈ AC ,
PB(A) =
PC(AB)
PC(B)
(51)
provided that B ∈ B and A ∈ AB. This allows us to define probabilities conditional
on B, provided they don’t clash with those yielded by some other D ∈ B such that
B ⊆ D, B ∈ AD, and PD(B) > 0. For this reason, we will usually assume the further
condition,
iii). For all C ∈ B and B ⊆ C, if B ∈ AC and PC(B) > 0, then B ∈ B and AC ⊆ AB.
Given a probability space 〈S,A, P 〉, let A∗ be the subset of A consisting of sets B
with P (B) > 0. Let P ∗ be the function that maps B ∈ A∗ to the probability function
PB : A → [0, 1], given by
PB(A) =
P (AB)
P (B)
. (52)
Then 〈S,A,A∗, P ∗〉 is a conditional probability space, corresponding to the standard
choice of having conditional probability defined only when the condition has nonzero
probability.
We will say that a probability space 〈S,A, P 〉 is invariant under a bijection T : S →
S if and only if T leaves the set A of measurable sets invariant, and, for all A ∈ A,
P (T(A)) = P (A), where T(A) is {T(x) | x ∈ A}. Similarly, a conditional probability
space 〈S,A,B, P 〉 is invariant under T if and only if T(A) = A, T(B) = B, and, for all
B ∈ B, AT(B) = T(AB) and PT(B)(T(A)) = PB(A) for all A ∈ AB.
conditions, and not containing the null set, Re´nyi calls a bunch of sets. In this work, Re´nyi calls conditional
probabilities spaces in which conditionalization on null propositions is permitted generalized conditional
probability spaces (see Problem 2.8).
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1.3 Lebesgue measure
Consider the unit interval I = (0, 1]. Let B be the the smallest σ-algebra that contains
all intervals (a, b]. These are the Borel sets. Extension to the entire real line, or to Rn,
is straightforward; the Borel subsets of Rn are the elements of the smallest σ-algebra
containing all rectangles of the form
{(x1, ..., xn) | xi ∈ (ai, bi], i = 1, ..., n}.
The uniform measure, or Lebesgue measure, on 〈I,B〉 is the unique countably additive
measure that assigns measure b−a to each interval (a, b]. Call this measure λ. Though
the Borel sets include all sets of interest for most purposes, we can extend our measure
to a wider σ-algebra, called the Lebesgue measurable sets. We define an outer measure
P ∗, defined for any subset A of the unit interval, by
P ∗(A) = inf
∑
i
λ(Ai), (53)
where the infimum is taken over all countable collections {Ai} of intervals such that
A ⊆ ⋃iAi. The set L of Lebesgue measurable sets consists of all sets A ⊆ I such that
P ∗(AE) + P ∗(AcE) = P ∗(E) (54)
for all E ⊆ I, where Ac is the complement of A in I. It can be shown that this is a
σ-algebra, and that λ has a unique countably additive extension to L; this extension is
also called Lebesgue measure. Again, extension of this concept toRn is straightforward.
It can be shown that, if A is a Lebesgue-measurable subset of Rn with Lebesgue
measure zero, then every subset of A is Lebesgue measurable (and, of course, also has
Lebesgue measure zero).
Appendix 2 A rotationally invariant conditional
probability space
On the n-sphere Sn (that is, the n-dimensional space of points at unit distance from
a fixed point in n + 1-dimensional Euclidean space, which is a circle for n = 1, and
the surface of a sphere for n = 2), we construct a uniform spherical measure σn. One
way to characterize these measures is in terms of Lebesgue measure on the ambient
(n+ 1)-dimensional space. A subset of A of Sn is σn-measurable if and only the wedge
subtended by A—that is, the set of points on straight lines between points of A and the
origin—is Lebesgue measurable, and we take the measure of A to be proportional to
the Lebesgue measure of the wedge it subtends. Let Ln be the set of all σn-measurable
subsets of Sn.
Let S be a 2-sphere–that is, the surface of a sphere in 3D space—and let LS be
the set of all σ2-measurable subsets of S, and let σS be σ2 measure on 〈S,LS〉. Let C
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be the set of all circles on the sphere S. For each circle C ∈ C, let LC be the set of
σ1-measurable subsets of C, and let σC be σ1 measure on 〈C,LC〉.
We can construct standard conditional probability spaces 〈S,LS ,L∗S , P ∗S〉 and 〈C,LC ,L∗C , P ∗C〉,
where, as in 1.2, L∗S is the set of sets in LS with positive probability. We want to ex-
tend 〈S,LS ,L∗S , P ∗S〉 to encompass, in our set of conditions, other sets, including, at
minimum, all circles, in such a way that conditionalizing on any circle yields uniform
probabilities on that circle
Let us take B to be
B = L∗S ∪
⋃
C∈C
L∗C . (55)
Note that each element of B is either in L∗S or is a subset of a unique circle C (this is
because the members of L∗C have positive measure, and hence contain infinitely many
points, and no two circles share more than two points). Take AB to be LS for B ∈ L∗S .
For B ∈ L∗C , take A ∈ AB iff AB ∈ LC . Define
PB(A) =

λS(AB)
λS(B)
, B ∈ L∗S ;
λC(AB)
λC(B)
, B ∈ L∗C .
(56)
We have constructed a conditional probability space that is invariant under all rigid
rotations, and includes conditionalization on circles and some subsets of circles.
For any A ∈ LS with λS(A) = 0, every subset of A is a measurable set, and is
assigned measure 0. Since each circle C has λS(C) = 0, this means that every subset
of C is in LS . Since not every subset of C is in LC , PC(A) is not defined for arbitrary
A ∈ LS . We might want to extend PC so that it is defined on all A ∈ LS . But, as
already mentioned (see footnote 2), we can do so, and preserve rotational invariance,
only at the price of sacrificing countable additivity. We can’t get all that we want.
Appendix 3 The Eternal Coin: Proof of Dorr’s
theorem
We will speak in general terms, but readers should think of the example at hand, that
of the Eternal Coin. We assume Axiom (iii) of Appendix 1.2. In this appendix, we
will find ourselves conditionalizing on complex propositions, and it will be convenient
to shift from the subscript notation PrC for probabilities conditional on conditional
probabilities to the notation Pr( · |C).
Suppose there is a proposition P , and a transformation T, such that T(P ) |= P . If
Pr(P ) > 0, then
Pr(T(P ) | P ) = Pr(T(P ))
Pr(P )
, (57)
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and so T-invariance would entail that Pr(T(P ) | P ) = 1. Furthermore, if there exists
a proposition Z such that T(Z) = Z, P |= Z, and Pr(P |Z) > 0, then
Pr(T(P ) |P ) = Pr(T(P ) |Z)
Pr(P |Z) , (58)
and so, once again, T-invariance would entail that P (T(P ) |P ) = 1.
ButT-invariant propositions of the right sort may be hard to come by, and there
may be no such Z. Suppose, however, that there exist propositions X, Z, such that
P |= X |= Z, and T(P ) |= T(X) |= Z. Then, if P , T(P ), X, and T(X) are all in AZ ,
and Pr(P |Z) > 0, and if Pr(T(P ) |T(X)) is defined, we have
Pr(P |Z) = Pr(P |X) Pr(X |Z);
Pr(T(P ) |Z) = Pr(T(P ) |T(X)) Pr(T(X) |Z),
(59)
and so, still assuming that T(P ) |= P , we have
Pr(T(P ) |P ) = Pr(T(P ) |Z)
Pr(P |Z) =
Pr(T(P ) |T(X))
Pr(P |X)
Pr(T(X) |Z)
Pr(X |Z) . (60)
Now suppose that there is also a proposition F such that T−1(F ) |= F , with Pr(F |Z) >
0. Suppose, also, that T−1(F ) |= X. From this it follows that F |= T(X), and we have
Pr(T−1(F ) |F ) = Pr(T
−1(F ) |X)
Pr(F |T(X))
Pr(X |Z)
Pr(T(X) |Z) . (61)
Multiplying (60) and (61) gives us,
Pr(T(P ) |P ) Pr(T−1(F ) |F ) = Pr(T(P ) |T(X))
Pr(P |X)
Pr(T−1(F ) |X)
Pr(F |T(X) . (62)
So far, we haven’t invoked any symmetry assumptions. If we impose T-invariance, we
have
Pr(T(P ) |T(X)) = Pr(P |X);
Pr(T−1(F ) |X) = Pr(F |T(X)), (63)
and (62) becomes
Pr(T(P ) |P ) Pr(T−1(F ) |F ) = 1, (64)
from which it follows that
Pr(T(P ) |P ) = Pr(T−1(F ) |F ) = 1. (65)
Now, since we have assumed that T(P ) |= P and T−1(F ) |= F , there always do
exist Z,X satisfying the conditions stipulated. Take Z to be P ∨ F , and take X to be
P ∨ T−1(F ). Then T(X) is T(P ) ∨ F .
To sum up: we have established
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Proposition 1 Let 〈Ω,A,B, P r〉 be a conditional probability space that satisfies con-
dition (iii) and is invariant under a transformation T. Suppose there are propositions
P, F , such that Z = P ∨ F ∈ B and P, F ∈ AZ , such that
i). (a) T(P ) |= P ;
(b) T−1(F ) |= F ;
ii). (a) Pr(P |Z) > 0;
(b) Pr(F |Z) > 0.
Then
Pr(T(P ) |P ) = Pr(T−1(F ) |F ) = 1.
Applied to the Eternal Coin, let T be S1, which shifts everything forward one day.
P , as before, is the proposition that the coin handed Heads every day in the past, and
F , the proposition that the coin will land Heads every day in the future. Let H be the
proposition that the coin lands Heads today. Then S1(P ) is HP , and S
−1
1 (F ) is HF .
Clearly, HP |= P and HF |= F . If
Pr(P |P ∨ F ) > 0;
Pr(F |P ∨ F ) > 0; (66)
and if
Pr(HP |HP ∨ F ) = Pr(P |P ∨HF );
Pr(F |HP ∨ F ) = Pr(HF |P ∨HF ), (67)
then
Pr(H|P ) = Pr(H|F ) = 1. (68)
We can run the same argument with Sk, for any positive k, yielding the conclusion
that, for every n ≥ 0, the probability conditional on P that the coin lands Heads today
and n days into the future is 1, as is the probability, conditional on F , that the coin
lands Heads today and n days into the past.
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Notes
1We will also use the notation P (A|C), when convenient.
2 The fact that, in probability theory, we can’t always get what we want, is a
familiar fact. We might want our probability function to be defined on arbitrary
subsets of our probability space, but, as is well-known, we can’t always do so
while satisfying desiderata such as symmetry conditions and countable additiv-
ity. Consider, for example, the task of defining a uniform distribution—that is,
a distribution invariant under all rotations—on the unit circle. There can be no
distribution that is invariant under rotations, is countably additive, and is defined
on all subsets of the unit circle. The proof is found in many probability texts, e.g.
Billingsley (2012, p. 47). The standard response is to preserve countable additiv-
ity and to restrict the domain of definition of the probability function to certain
subsets of the probability space, the measurable sets, leaving the probability of
other sets undefined. In one and two dimensions, as Banach (1923) showed, one
can extend the probability function to one defined on arbitrary subsets, if one is
willing to give up countable additivity. The well-known Banach-Tarski paradox
shows that we can’t do so in three-dimensional space; there is no finitely additive
set function that is defined on all subsets and invariant under translations and
rotations.
3Adapted from Ha´jek (2003).
4Based on Kolmogorov (1950, §V.2), which in turn is based on Borel (1909,
§45) (§8.6 of Borel 1965). See also Jaynes (2003, §15.7), Ha´jek (2003, §4.4).
5To see this: let X be any random variable, with distribution µX , and take
g(X) to be the function of X given by
g(X) =
∫ X
−∞
dµX(x). (69)
Then g has range in [0, 1], and, for any a ∈ [0, 1],
P (g(X) ≤ a) = a. (70)
That is, g(X) is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
6If C is a finite set, we can have a probability function that always assigns
equal probabilities to sets of equal cardinality. This is not possible if C is infinite.
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In the infinite case, there must be measurable sets A, B, of equal cardinality, with
P (A) 6= P (B). We can then choose some mapping that takes A to B.
7This is necessary because, if one has nonzero credence that the coin is not
fair, or that the tosses are not independent, then conditionalization on either F
or P will send credence that the setup is as described to zero.
8See Appendix 1 for definitions of any terms that might be unfamiliar.
9In this section, we use Pr for our probability function to avoid confusion
with the proposition P .
10In this section, we will find ourselves conditionalizing on some fairly complex
propositions, and so it will be convenient to switch from the subscript notation
for conditional probabilities used in the rest of the paper to the slash notation.
11That is, take
An =
⋃
u∈A
CKn(u). (71)
12Perhaps. The more one thinks about what is required to give values to these
conditional probabilities, the less clear it becomes that we have intuitions about
them at all.
13Oddly enough, this has been disputed. In connection with this example, E.T.
Jaynes (2003, p. 470) writes,
Nearly everybody feels that he knows perfectly well what a great circle
is; so it is difficult to get people to see that the term ‘great circle’ is
ambiguous until we specify what limiting operation is to produce it.
This strikes me as confused. One and the same great circle can be the limit of
many different decreasing sequences of subsets of the sphere, but the circle is not
itself produced by the limiting operation. Not so with probabilities conditional
on a great circle, which, unless stipulated as primitive, are obtained via some
limiting operation.
14In his discussion of the Borel paradox, Kolmogorov writes, “This shows that
the concept of a probability conditional on an isolated given hypothesis whose
probability equals 0 is inadmissible” (Kolmogorov, 1950, p. 51).
15The notation is intended to be both reminiscent of, and distinct from, the
notation used for conditional probabilities.
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16This is example 33.11 of Billingsley (2012).
17This is even easier to see in these days in which laboratory equipment has
digital readout than it was in the old days of pointers and dials!
18To see this: suppose that the probability distribution Q over the parameters
is given by a density function µ. That is, for all Borel subsets ∆ of the parameter
space,
Q(Θ ∈ ∆) =
∫
∆
µ(θ) dθ. (72)
Then, by (32),
P (E & Θ ∈ ∆) =
∫
∆
LE(θ)µ(θ) dθ. (73)
Combing this with (34), we get
PE(Θ ∈ ∆) = P (E & Θ ∈ ∆)
P (E)
=
∫
∆
LE(θ)µ(θ)
P (E)
dθ. (74)
Suppose, now, that PE is given by a density function µE.
PE(Θ ∈ ∆) =
∫
∆
µE(θ) dθ. (75)
Then, setting (74) and (75) equal to each other, we get∫
∆
µE(θ) dθ =
∫
∆
LE(θ)µ(θ)
P (E)
dθ. (76)
Since this must be true for every Borel set ∆, the integrands must be equal almost
everywhere.
19Though inspired and instructed by Re´nyi’s treatment, this definition departs
from Re´nyi in two ways. First, Re´nyi requires PB(A) to be defined for every
A ∈ A. This may be undesirable; see Appendix 2. Second, Re´nyi requires
countable additivity, and we leave open the possibility of conditional probability
functions that are merely finitely additive.
In his later book, (2007a), Re´nyi revises the definition of a conditional prob-
ability space to exclude zero-probability conditions, and further requires that the
set B of conditions be closed under finite disjunctions, and that it contain a se-
quence {Bn} that covers Ω (see §2.2). A subset of a σ-algebra A satisfying these
two conditions, and not containing the null set, Re´nyi calls a bunch of sets. In
this work, Re´nyi calls conditional probabilities spaces in which conditionalization
on null propositions is permitted generalized conditional probability spaces (see
Problem 2.8).
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